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Abstract 
 
This study provides the first set of estimates of the returns to schooling over an extended period 
in Russia and Ukraine (1985-2002).  There has been an increase in returns to schooling in both 
countries but the increase is much bigger in Russia than in Ukraine.  The intriguing question is 
why returns to schooling in Russia and Ukraine diverged so much over the transition period 
while the skill composition of employment did not.  Our approach in analyzing the sources of 
cross-country differences in returns to schooling is to compare the Mincerian earnings functions 
between the two countries and then to employ decomposition techniques.  Using semiparametric 
methods, we construct counterfactual wage distributions for university and secondary school 
graduates for Ukraine using the distributions of Russian characteristics, returns to characteristics, 
and unobservables.  This allows us to decompose differences in returns to schooling between the 
two countries due to differences in the labor market returns (price effect), differences in 
unobservables (residual effect), and differences in the labor force composition (composition 
effect).  We conclude that of these three effects the price effect makes a major contribution to the 
observed differences in the returns to schooling.  
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1. Introduction  
  This paper contributes to the understanding of the variation in returns to schooling among 
the countries that have gone through significant economic transformation.  Although the general 
trend in returns to schooling has been increasing in the economies that moved from plan to 
market, we do observe significant variation in the speed of changes:  e.g., Russia experienced a 
sharp increase in returns to schooling within a few years of reform, whereas Ukraine exhibited a 
very low rate of growth.  The puzzling question is why returns to schooling in Russia and 
Ukraine diverged so much over the transition period while the skill composition of employment 
did not?  This paper explores the sources of the differences in returns to schooling between 
Russia and Ukraine. 
  Our study takes advantage of the institutional comparability between the two countries.  
Russia and Ukraine were part of the Soviet Union until 1991.
1  They shared the same 
government, institutions, and policies.  As we demonstrate in the paper, the two countries had 
remarkably similar wage distributions, earnings structure, educational attainment, labor force 
composition, and returns to schooling during the pre-reform period.  Even now Russia and 
Ukraine continue to have similar educational systems and workforce characteristics. 
Despite this common history and similar initial conditions, the two economies performed 
rather differently.  Ukraine made very few structural reforms until 1997 and only after 1997 did 
the speed of reforms accelerate and the scope widen (Linn, 2001).
2  In assessing the progress of 
the transition to a market economy in all 27 countries of the region, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development consistently scored the results of market reforms less favorably 
in Ukraine than in Russia (EBRD, 2001).  The labor market outcomes of reforms in the two 
countries also turned out to be different.
3  In Russia, overall wage inequality increased sharply, 
with a significant and notable increase in returns to schooling (Brainerd, 1998; Sabirianova, 
                                                 
1 The breakup of Czechoslovakia is another interesting case for analyzing the divergence in returns to schooling 
between Czech and Slovak Republics during the reform period (see Chase, 1998; Filer et al., 1999).   
2 Typically, Russian economic reforms have preceded similar reforms in Ukraine.  For example, Russia liberalized 
most domestic prices in January 1992, while Ukraine did so at the end of 1994.  Ukraine introduced a uniform 
exchange rate two years later than Russia did, with a full current account convertibility introduced in 1997.  Russia 
essentially completed mass privatization by July 1994, while Ukraine began its large-scale privatization program at 
the end 1994 (EBRD, 2001).   
3 Ukraine lagged behind Russia in labor market reforms.  For example, Russia abolished the wage grid in the non-
public sector in 1991, but Ukraine continued to allocate wages according the old wage grid based on the national 
agreement between trade unions and the government until 1993.  Similarly, Russia abolished a system of penalties 
on the growth of wage fund in 1995 while Ukraine did so at the end of 1996.  Until 2004, Ukraine had consistently 
higher marginal personal income tax rates and indirect income taxes paid by enterprises than Russia.     2
2003).  In contrast, skill wage inequality in Ukraine did not increase as much over the same 
period and returns to schooling were among the lowest among countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.  This observation of low reform progress and concurrent low returns to schooling in 
Ukraine is consistent with the recent finding of Fleisher, Sabirianova, and Wang (2004) on the 
positive effect of the speed of market reforms on a country’s returns to schooling.  
Our approach in analyzing the sources of cross-country differences in returns to 
schooling is to compare the Mincerian earnings functions between the two countries and then to 
use semiparametric decomposition techniques in the spirit of Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993).  
We construct counterfactual distributions of log wages for university and secondary school 
graduates for Ukraine using the distributions of Russian characteristics, returns to characteristics, 
and unobservables.  These counterfactual distributions provide an estimate of the distributions of 
Ukrainian log wages that would have prevailed if Ukraine had the same features as Russia.  This 
allows us to decompose differences in returns to schooling between the two countries into shares 
due to differences in the labor market returns (price effect), differences in unobservables 
(residual effect), and differences in the labor force composition (composition effect). 
This study is the first to provide the long series of the estimates of the returns to 
schooling in Russia and Ukraine starting from the planning period.  In our comparative analysis, 
we use Russian and Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Surveys covering a period from 1985 to 
2002.  In addition to the institutional comparability between the two countries, our study also 
benefits from the definitional comparability between the two surveys.  Most of the key variables 
have similar definitions, and the estimated earnings functions have the same specifications.   
Thus, our study avoids a common problem in cross-country studies, where the differences in the 
estimated parameters are influenced by the discrepancies in the quality of data, estimation 
methods, and definitions of variables.
4  In the next section of the paper, we describe in detail the 
data and variables used in the empirical analysis. 
2. Russian and Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Surveys 
The data for this study are pooled from the two household surveys – Russian 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
                                                 
4 Useful discussion of this problem in emerging markets is provided by Behrman and Rosenzweig (1994) and 
Srinivasan (1994).   3
(ULMS).
5  We use the second wave of RLMS that started in 1994, with 4,781 dwelling units 
selected by a three-stage stratified clustered sampling method and with 3,973 households 
responded.  In the subsequent years of survey (1995-1996, 1998, 2000-2002), the new 
households that moved to the initially sampled dwellings were added and the old households that 
moved from the original sample to the new address were followed up, whenever possible.  The 
sample size varies from year to year.  For example, there were 8,893 individuals who completed 
the adult questionnaire in 1994, 8,342 in 1996, 8,701 in 1998, 9,074 in 2000, and 10,497 in 2002.  
To ensure the representativeness of cross-sections in our analysis, we have to exclude those 
respondents that moved from the original sample.
6  This leaves us with 8,122 respondents in 
1996, 7,894 in 1998, 7,568 in 2000, and 7,875 in 2002, and we base our wage analysis on a 
sample of 3,384-4,415 employed adults who have complete information on wages, education, 
and demographic characteristics (see Table A1).  The RLMS 2000 also contains a series of 
retrospective questions regarding jobs held in 1985 and 1990.  The number of persons who 
responded to the questions on wages in 1985 was 4,230 and in 1990 was 3,976.   
The Ukrainian survey is based on a stratified random nationally representative sample of 
4,096 households.  Unlike RLMS, ULMS started only in 2003.  To fill out the lack of labor force 
data in Ukraine in the 1990s, ULMS has gathered employment histories for 1986, 1991, and 
continuously from 1997 to 2003. 8,641 individuals of age 15-72 participated in the Ukrainian 
survey.  The response rate was 66% for households and 87% for individuals within the 
households.  The sample of employed with non-missing values on wages, education, and 
demographic characteristics ranges from 2,958 in 1998 to 4,197 in 1986.  The sample 
construction is explained in Appendix Table A1.   
Both surveys contain rich information on household and individual characteristics, albeit 
their focus is somewhat different.  RLMS focuses more on household behavior and has extensive 
sections on household income and expenditures, health, nutrition, children and women issues, 
                                                 
5 RLMS has been organized by Barry Popkin and conducted by the Consortium led by the Carolina Population 
Center in collaboration with the Institute of Sociology at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow.  ULMS has 
been organized by Hartmut Lehmann and carried out by the Consortium led by the Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA), Bonn in collaboration with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.  We are very thankful to both teams 
for their excellent work.  
6 We find that the estimates of the returns to schooling are not affected by excluding respondents that moved from 
the original sample.  We re-estimated the standard Mincerian earnings function (see Section 3) on a larger sample by 
adding a dummy for movers and its interaction with years of schooling.  In all years, we did not find statistically 
significant (at the 10% level) differences in wages and returns to schooling associated with respondents’ moving 
from the original sample.    4
whereas ULMS devotes a significant portion of its questionnaire to the retrospective histories of 
employment, education, and migration.  Despite these differences between the questionnaires, 
the two surveys provide a consistent set of the individual characteristics required for our 
analysis.  These characteristics include individual earnings, hours of work, education, 
demographics, job tenure, and characteristics of the primary employer such as ownership and 
size. 
The definitions of all variables used in the empirical analysis are provided in Appendix 
Table A2.  Most of the individual attributes have identical definitions in both surveys, e.g. 
gender, age, potential labor market experience, job tenure, average weekly hours of work, and 
capital.  In a few cases, an original variable has been modified to make it comparable between 
the surveys.  For example, the continuous variable of the employer size from RLMS has been 
recoded into a categorical variable, with the same size categories as in ULMS.  Detailed 
information on firm ownership from ULMS has been aggregated into the three broad categories 
of ownership available in RLMS:  foreign (including domestic firms with some foreign capital); 
private (including self-employed, cooperatives, fully and partially privatized enterprises, and 
newly established private enterprises); and state (including budgetary organizations, state 
enterprises, local municipal enterprises, and state and collective farms).  
Both Russian and Ukrainian data contain very detailed information on formal schooling, 
including the type of schools, actual years of studies, obtained degrees, and the date of school 
completion.  At least two alternative measures of the years of schooling can be constructed for 
the years of survey:  the actual years of studies from all schools attended and the adjusted years 
of schooling that are imputed from the number of years required for the highest degree obtained.  
For the retrospective years (1985-1991), however, only the latter measure can be imputed 
accurately on the base of the date of school completion, and we employ this second measure in 
most of our empirical analysis.  The correlation between these two measures of schooling is 
relatively high (e.g. in 2002, the simple correlation coefficient is 0.900 in Russia and 0.895 in 
Ukraine).  The results of the sensitivity analysis for the choice of schooling variables will be 
discussed below.   
The dependent variable in our analysis is a log of monthly contractual (accrued) wage 
after taxes at the primary job.  Using contractual wage in the earnings functions is generally 
preferred over the wages received in some short reference period (e.g. month), especially during   5
the periods of mass wage delays and high volatility in wage payments that both countries 
experienced in the 1990s.
7  Wages actually received in the last month is often zero when the 
wage debt accumulates and it could be much higher than the contractual wage when the debt is 
paid back.  In ULMS, the measure of net contractual wages is available for all years for both 
employees and self-employed.  Wages received in a different currency are converted into 
Ukrainian hryvnyas (UAH).
8  In RLMS, this measure is available only for employees and only 
for 1998-2002.  For 1994-1996, we have followed the method of Earle and Sabirianova (2002), 
imputing the contractual wage for workers with wage arrears as the ratio of the total wage debt to 
the number of monthly wages owed.  For workers without wage arrears the contractual wage is 
considered to be the actual after-tax monthly wage received in cash or in kind in the last 30 days 
from the primary job.  This measure of actually paid earnings is also used for self-employed in 
1994-2002.   
For the Soviet period of our data, the definitions of wages in both countries are the same.  
The main concern here is the presence of a recall bias.  Do people actually remember what wages 
they received 17 or even 10 years ago?  An econometrician might argue that because wage is the 
dependent variable, the recall bias should not affect the results as long as it can be assumed as an 
additive white noise.  We can also add that the Soviet practice of wage payments according to 
the rigid wage grid, nearly zero inflation and strong attachment of a Soviet worker to one job are 
likely to reduce the recall error (Munich, Svejnar and Terrell, 2005a).  Importantly, three of the 
four selected years are memorable, pivotal points in the Soviet history.  In 1985 Gorbachev came 
to power and perestroika began, in 1986 the Chernobyl catastrophe in Ukraine shook the world, 
and in 1991 Gorbachev resigned, the Soviet Union ended, and Russia and Ukraine began their 
new independent history.  Figure 1 shows that the shape of wage distributions in 1985/1986 is 
very similar between the two countries.  The similarity is remarkable given the fact that the two 
samples are drawn independently in different years and the recall period is one year and half 
longer in Ukraine than in Russia.  The mean wages from the surveys (wSAM) are also close to the 
mean wages from the national statistical yearbooks (wNSY) for corresponding years (wSAM,85 =207 
                                                 
7 Note that contractual wage also has shortcomings since it implicitly assumes zero costs associated with the delay 
of payments and that all arrears will be paid back.  Ideally, we would like to use wages actually received during 
longer time period (e.g., 6 or 12 months).  The ULMS dataset provides such a variable but only in the last year.  In 
Section 4, we discuss how the estimates are sensitive to the alternative measures of wages. 
8 Ukraine had rubles till 1992, karbovancy in 1992-1996, and hryvnyas after 1996.  People may also receive wages 
in a foreign currency, typically U.S. dollars.    6
and wNSY,85 =199 for Russia and wSAM,86 =173 and wNSY,86 =174 for Ukraine).  All of these facts 
combined suggest that it is plausible to approximate the true wage distributions in the Soviet 
period by the wages reported retrospectively.  Yet, even if the errors of recall are present in the 
data, they should not bias the results in the direction of one country or the other.
9   
Another important issue in retrospective surveys is the under-representation of older age 
groups due to their higher mortality.  To reduce the potential effect of the mortality-related 
sample attrition on the estimates of returns to schooling, we restrict our analysis to the prime age 
group 15-59 (the sample size is given in Appendix Table A1), and for the Soviet period of our 
data we employ the sample weights that are constructed on the base of the USSR Census 1989, 
with under-represented groups receiving larger weights.  We use the sample weights for more 
recent years as well but their effect on the results is not statistically significant, as we show 
below. 
Table 1, Appendix Table A3, and Figure 1 report the summary statistics for both surveys.  
It is evident that Russia and Ukraine exhibit very similar labor force characteristics during the 
pre-reform and reform periods.  For example, mean adjusted years of schooling are identical in 
Russia and Ukraine in 1985/1986 and differ only by 0.6 years in 2002.
10  The average length of 
the workweek is about 41-43 hours and the mean labor market experience is around 21 years in 
both countries.  Gender and urban compositions are similar too.  At the same time, tenure is 
longer in Ukraine than in Russia by 0.8-1.6 years.  Although certain differences are noticeable 
with respect to firm characteristics (Ukraine has a higher share of the employed in very large 
enterprises and in the state sector), an increase in the share of workers in private and foreign-
owned firms and small businesses is apparent in both countries.  Table A3 results suggest that 
the supply changes are unlikely to explain the different time paths in returns to schooling 
between the two countries because of very similar dynamics in workers’ educational attainment.  
In both countries the share of workers with university degrees has been continuously growing at 
                                                 
9 It is difficult to determine the sign of the bias generated by the recall errors in variables because the recall error is 
likely to be mean reverting especially in wages (see Kim and Solon, 2005).  We can expect however that the size of 
the recall error is negatively correlated with memory and thus, the error is increasing with age and decreasing with 
education.  This implies that coefficients on schooling are likely to be less downward biased than coefficients on 
tenure and labor market experience.  In any case there is no reason to believe that this should bias the results towards 
one of the countries we compare. 
10 The reported differences in the actual years of schooling between the two countries could be due to the fact that 
ULMS specifically asks respondents to not count interruptions during the study such as maternity leave or required 
army service while in RLMS respondents might have included these breaks in the total years of schooling.   7
the same rate and the share of low-education workers experienced a declining trend.  Finally, 
Figure 1 documents another notable fact – starting from essentially identical shapes of wage 
distributions in 1985/1986, Russian and Ukrainian wage distributions significantly diverged over 
the transition period, with Russia having considerably higher levels of overall wage inequality.  
3.  Earnings Function Analysis 
In this section, we compare the estimates of the Mincerian earnings functions in Russia 
and Ukraine and present the results of sensitivity analysis to show how robust the obtained 
returns to schooling are to the choice of specifications, variables, and methods used.  
We begin by estimating the basic Mincerian earnings function with a standard set of 
covariates available for both countries and all years:
11 
2
0 1234 5 ln it it it it it it it w sch exp exp female capital β ββββ β ε =+ + + + + + , (1)   
where i indexes individuals, t indexes time, wit is monthly contractual wages after taxes at the 
primary job, schit is adjusted years of schooling, expit is years of potential labor market 
experience,  femaleit is a dummy variable indicating if an individual is female, capitalit is a 
dummy variable indicating if an individual i lives in the capital city, and εit is an independently 
distributed error term.  Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A2.   
The OLS estimates of Eq.1 for Russia and Ukraine are presented in Table 2, Panel A and 
Panel B respectively. Until 1991, returns to schooling were similar for Russia and Ukraine, with 
2.8-3.4% in 1985/1986
12 and 3.9% in 1990/1991.  With the demise of the Soviet Union, 
however, schooling returns significantly diverged: in Russia they increased sharply to 8.1% in 
1996, and then to 9.2% in 2002 while in Ukraine they barely changed reaching 4.5% in 2002.     
As in a typical Mincerian earnings equation, the estimated returns to potential experience 
are concave.  But compared to the estimates from the United States, the wage-experience profiles 
are flatter and average returns to labor market experience are relatively small.
13  The small 
experience effect could be caused by the changing nature of the transition economies that reward 
                                                 
11 We restrict our analysis to the years that are available for both countries, that is 1985(1986), 1990(1991), 
1996(1997), 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
12 The difference in returns to schooling between the two countries in 1985/1986 is not statistically different from 
zero.  
13 This result is consistent with earlier studies by Flanagan (1998) and Rutkowski (1997) who also documented low 
returns to labor market experience in Czech Republic and Poland.    8
younger, more mobile, and more adaptive people.  It also appears that the experience profile is 
less concave in Ukraine than in Russia.   
The male wage premium is significantly larger in Russia than in Ukraine.  Although the 
gender wage gap fell in Russia from 53% in 1998 to 47% in 2002, it is still much higher than the 
gap during the Soviet time in both Russia and Ukraine (41% in 1991) and during the transition 
period in Ukraine (40-42%).  The wage premium for living in a capital city is high in both 
countries.  However, if in Ukraine this premium stays approximately constant at 30% over 1991-
2002, the premium for living in Moscow exhibits a continuous increase from 14% in 1990 to 
63% in 2002.
14 
As a complement to OLS estimates, we present the estimates of returns to schooling 
obtained from the series of quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  While the OLS 
method produces only mean prices of observable characteristics, quantile regressions can 
produce the whole distribution of returns to schooling.  This allows us to see whether observed 
changes in schooling returns are uniform or concentrated in certain groups.  Formally, we 
estimate the basic Mincerian function as in Eq.1: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2
01 2 3 4 5 ln |
kk k k k k
ki t i t i t i t i t i t i t Q w sch exp exp female capital β ββββ β =+ + + + + X , (2) 
where  () it it k X w Q | ln  denotes the k
th percentile of distribution of log wages conditional on the 
covariate matrix Xit and  ) (k
j β is the k
th percentile estimate of the slope of variable j.  For each 
percentile k, country, and period (1985/1986, 1990/1991, 1996/1997, and 2002), we estimate 
Eq.2 and plot the obtained distributions of returns to schooling in Figure 2.  Again we see the 
growing differences in returns to schooling between Russia and Ukraine.  It is interesting that the 
cross-country differences were more pronounced in the middle of distribution in 1996/1997.  By 
2002, however, the bottom percentiles in Russia exhibited the largest increase in returns to 
schooling implying that having additional education at the bottom of wage distribution makes 
people significantly better off.  
This first analysis of the data indicates that Russia and Ukraine during the Soviet period 
had very similar shapes of wage distributions, composition of labor force, returns to schooling, 
                                                 
14 The relatively low “Moscow” premium during the Soviet period could be explained by the fact that, unlike other 
Soviet republics, Russia had many territories where workers were compensated for living in unfavorable climate 
conditions.   The base “Moscow” salary was simply multiplied by “the regional wage coefficient”, thus compressing 
the average Moscow premium.  The high premium afterwards could be resulted from the system of living permits 
that drives the overall wages in the capital up.   9
and returns to other observable characteristics.  Within a few years of reforms, however, the 
differences in prices of observable characteristics, including returns to schooling, became 
apparent.  Below we further investigate this divergence using a larger set of explanatory 
variables that are available for 1996-2002 years.  In particular, the estimated specification is  
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0 1234 5
2
67 , ,
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ln it it it it it it
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ββ α γ ε
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 (3) 
where tenit is years of tenure at the primary job, ownn,it is  a set of dummies for state, private, and 
mixed ownership types, sizem,it is a set of dummies for the (employment) size categories of the 
firm an individual i works for.
15   
The estimates of augmented Mincerian earnings function are presented in Table 3.  The 
overall trend and the levels of returns to schooling remain qualitatively the same as in the basic 
Mincerian earnings function shown in Table 2.  Again we see that rates of return rose sharply in 
Russia and hardly changed in Ukraine over the transition period.  Controlling for tenure and firm 
characteristics does not affect returns to labor market experience but reduces gender wage 
differences and a premium for living in a capital city by approximately five percentage points in 
both countries.  The obtained insignificant tenure effect could have been expected especially 
during the early reform period as accumulated firm-specific human capital becomes obsolete in 
the new economic environment.  What is surprising is that after ten years of transition the return 
to tenure has not recovered to even 0.5%.  Perhaps workers with long tenures continue to be 
associated with inefficient state firms and lack up-to-date skills. 
Firm characteristics significantly contribute to explaining variation in wages.  There are 
important differences in wages across ownership types.  In both countries, foreign-owned firms 
pay the highest wages ceteris paribus, followed by private firms, while the state sector has the 
lowest wages.  But the non-state/state wage gap is somewhat larger in Russia than in Ukraine.  
Specifically, workers in foreign-owned enterprises earn 42%-54% more in Russia and 39%-45% 
more in Ukraine relative to state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  Likewise, private-owned firms pay 
                                                 
15 We have also estimated more flexible functional forms of the earnings functions allowing the returns to schooling 
to vary by gender and by ownership type.  In both countries and in all years, we can not reject the null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on interactions of years of schooling with dummies for ownership type and gender equal to zero 
at the standard significance levels.  The lack of variation in returns to schooling by ownership type is consistent with 
the hypothesis that an increase in schooling returns in transition economies is common for all sectors and is driven 
by market rather than by ownership effect (see Munich, Terrell and Svejnar, 2005b).   10
their workers 30-40% and 16-26% more in Russia and Ukraine, respectively, compared to SOEs.  
Our estimates also demonstrate a significant and increasing over time employer size-wage 
effect.
16  To some extent, this result is surprising given that large firms suffered the most from 
disorganization caused by the collapse of the command economy (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997).  
Perhaps our observations reflect the late stage of transition when disorganization gradually 
diminishes and surviving large firms recover their competitiveness and start paying wage 
premium over small firms again. 
We check the sensitivity of the obtained estimates of returns to schooling by relaxing 
sample restrictions, employing different definitions of the key variables, and including other 
controls to the baseline equation (Eq.1).  Table 4 presents the results of the sensitivity analysis.   
The estimates appear to be insensitive to the sample weights in both countries and to the age 
restrictions of the sample in ULMS (which is upper-bounded to 72 years old).  In RLMS, 
including older age groups reduces the estimated rates of return by 0.1-0.8 percentage points. 
Alternative definitions of schooling and wages do change the schooling returns but do not 
affect the overall trends and conclusions.  Using actual years of schooling instead of adjusted 
years of schooling raises the estimates of returns to schooling by 0.4-1.0 percentage points for 
Ukraine and decreases the estimates by 1.2-1.3 percentage points for Russia.  The wage measure 
that we criticized earlier for its non-random volatility – wages actually received last month –  
reduces the baseline estimates by 0.1-1.6 percentage points in Russia and increases it by 0.5 
percentage points in Ukraine.  The returns to schooling estimates based on earnings actually 
received during the last six months (available only in Ukraine) are very close to the estimates 
obtained using contractual wage.  In both countries having hourly wage rate as a dependent 
variable produces higher estimates of returns to schooling relative to the baseline estimates. 
A few additional variables, which are not available for both countries and for all years, 
are also included in the earnings functions to check if the results are sensitive to the inclusion of 
these variables (see Table 4).  For Russia, we find that industry dummies practically do not affect 
the rates of returns but district fixed effects reduce the estimates of returns to schooling 
significantly by up to 2.1 percentage point.  It is unlikely however that the district effect on 
returns to schooling would be different in Ukraine if this variable were available.  
                                                 
16 This result is consistent with the positive size-wage gap documented in the U.S. literature.  Traditional 
explanations of the positive size-wage gap appeal to higher productivity of large firms, selection of better workers, 
higher monitoring costs, rent-sharing , and efficiency wages to prevent shirking (see Oi and Idson, 1999).     11
Family background variables are often used as a control variable for unobserved ability 
or as an instrument to correct for the possible endogeneity of schooling due to measurement error 
and omitted ability variables (see Card, 1995; Ashenfelter and Zimmerman, 1997).  Because the 
downward biases resulting from measurement error are often bigger than the upward omitted 
ability biases, OLS estimates are typically lower than IV estimates (e.g., see Angrist and 
Krueger, 1991; Card, 2001).
17  Unfortunately, only the Ukrainian survey has information on 
parental education and occupation.  Even so it is unlikely that the family background effect on 
Russian returns to schooling is significantly different.  We first use parental education and 
occupation (defined in Appendix Table A2) as control variables and receive a fairly standard 
result of the smaller estimates of schooling returns after controlling for ability proxies.  Next we 
use family background together with age and age squared as instruments for years of education 
and labor market experience.
18  Table 4 shows that IV estimates of returns to schooling increase 
from 7.3% in 1986 to 9.2% in 1991 and then further increase to 12.0% in 2002.  These numbers 
are considerably larger than the corresponding OLS estimates, which is consistent with studies 
for other transition economies (see Heckman and Lee, 2003, for China; Filer et al., 1999, for 
Czech and Slovak Republics). 
To summarize, although in some instances returns to schooling appear to be sensitive to 
the choice of variables and specifications, these should not affect the overall finding of the 
divergence in rates of returns between Russia and Ukraine.   
Conceptually, the estimates we obtained so far depict gross monetary returns to 
schooling.  But what if low Ukrainian monetary returns are compensated by the higher non-
monetary benefits of schooling or its lower direct costs, thus leading to the higher net value of 
education?  For example, part of the returns to schooling may occur in the form of lower 
unemployment rate.  Simple descriptive statistics show that this is a valid statement in both 
countries but the relative difference in unemployment rates between university and secondary 
school graduates is much higher in Russia than in Ukraine.  The unemployment rate in 2002 for 
individuals with a university degree was 4.5% in Russia and 8% in Ukraine while for individuals 
with secondary education it was 9.1% in Russia and 12.3% in Ukraine (ILO, 2004; Goskomstat, 
                                                 
17 Card (2001) also discusses several other explanations of larger IV estimates, including unobserved differences 
between the treatment and comparison groups, specification searching, and heterogeneity in returns to schooling. 
18 Sargan's test cannot reject validity of instruments at any reasonable significance level.   12
2003).  Russian educated workers, therefore, additionally benefit from schooling by having a 
lower probability of being unemployed than their Ukrainian counterparts. 
The direct costs of education are another important factor that is often omitted in 
conventionally measured returns to schooling.  Hypothetically, it is possible to have different 
gross returns but similar net returns if direct costs were significantly lower in Ukraine than in 
Russia.  We follow Fleisher et al. (1996) in computing net returns to schooling as βSCH/(1+α)  
where α is the ratio of the direct costs of education (e.g. tuition) to the indirect costs (i.e. forgone 
earnings).  Specifically, we calculate α as follows 
U) W(
N
N
S T
k
k
k k
−
=
∑
1
α , (4) 
where Nk / N is the share of students enrolled in school type k (e.g., universities, professional 
secondary schools, and general secondary schools), Tk is annual tuition fees, Sk is the share of 
students who pay for their education, W is annual earnings, and U is unemployment rate.  
  The computed value of α in 2002 is 0.063 in Russia and 0.081 in Ukraine.
19  This implies 
that in order to obtain net returns to schooling, the estimated coefficient on years of schooling 
has to be multiplied by 0.941 in Russia and by 0.925 in Ukraine.  Such a correction hardly 
changes the magnitude of the gap in returns to schooling between the two countries and does not 
influence any of the conclusions from the previous analysis.  
4.  Sources of Differences in Returns to Schooling 
The salient finding of the previous section is that returns to schooling in Russia and 
Ukraine have considerably diverged since 1991.  Although we cannot establish the causal link 
between the speed of reforms and returns to schooling, we can try to explain what is driving the 
cross-country differences in returns to schooling, in particular, returns to higher education.
20  
                                                 
19 The calculations are based on the following data in 2002: W
RUS=53844 rubles, W
UKR=4512 hryvnays, U
RUS=8.6%, 
U
UKR=10.1%,  T
RUS=(22662, 11475, 5675) rubles, T
UKR=(1985, 1100, 900) hryvnays, S
RUS=(50.9%, 37%, 4%), 
S
UKR=(59%, 5.5%, 5.6%), N
RUS=(5947.5, 2585.5, 18440) thousands of students, N
UKR=(2269.8, 502.5, 6350.1) 
thousands of students in universities, professional secondary schools, and general secondary schools, respectively  
(Goskomstat, 2002a and 2002b; Derzhkomstat, 2002; Verhovna Rada, 2004; and Ukrainian Ministry of Education, 
2004). 
20 We are unaware of any method that could decompose the cross-country differences in returns to schooling as 
conventionally measured.  In this section we will focus on the differences between university and secondary school-
educated workers instead of using continuous years of schooling.       13
As a first step, we present graphs that show the difference in log wages between 
university- and secondary school-educated workers.  Figure 3 shows kernel density estimates for 
log wages for Russia and Ukraine in 1985/1986 and 2002.  The densities for university graduates 
are clearly to the right of the densities for secondary school graduates in both countries.  The 
estimated mean skill gap of wages is much higher in 2002 than in 1985/1986, and it is much 
higher in Russia (0.439) than in Ukraine (0.271) in 2002.  The difference between the two 
distributions can be interpreted as a measure of the university wage premium over secondary 
school diploma and formally can be written as: 
() () ( ) ( ) ,, , , ln ln ln
RUS RUS RUS RUS RUS RUS RUS RUS RUS
k t k ht k st k ht h h k st s s wQ w Q w Q X Q X βε βε ∆≡ − = + − +  
() () ( ) ( ) ,, , , ln ln ln
UKR UKR UKR UKR UKR UKR UKR UKR UKR
k t k ht k st k ht h h k st s s wQ w Q w Q X Q X βε βε ∆ ≡−= + − + , (5) 
where Qk(x) denotes the k
th percentile of variable x, h and s stand for higher and secondary 
education, respectively.  
  We illustrate this measure by plotting the difference in log wages between the two groups 
of workers at various percentiles of the distributions in Figure 4.  Consistent with quantile 
regressions estimates of returns to schooling, the returns to a university degree are greater in 
Russia than in Ukraine, the university wage premium is generally decreasing with percentiles, 
and it is the largest at lower percentiles.   
Next, we would like to see how imported Russian characteristics (Xs, βs, and εs) could 
have changed the returns to a university degree in Ukraine.  For this, we construct counterfactual 
distributions of log wages for university- and secondary school-educated workers for Ukraine 
using the distributions of Russian characteristics, returns to characteristics, and unobservables.  
These counterfactual distributions give an estimate of the distributions of Ukrainian log wages 
that would have prevailed if Ukraine had the same features as Russia.  Using actual and 
constructed wage distributions, we then compute and compare actual and counterfactual skill 
(university) wage premia and find the contributions of observable and unobservable 
characteristics and returns to cross-country differences in wage skill premium.  
In general form, the counterfactual skill wage premium at each percentile in Ukraine can 
be presented as 
() () ()
() ( ) ,, ln ln ln
UKR m UKR m UKR m
kt k h t k s t wQ w Q w ∆≡ − , (6) 
with m indicating the numeral of the corresponding counterfactual.     14
To construct skill premium distributions, we first estimate earnings functions (Eq.3) for 
each country and for each level of schooling (university degree and completed secondary school) 
and then generate counterfactual wage distributions following the semiparametric method 
developed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pearce (1993, henceforth JMP). 
For clarity, we succinctly write Eq.3 as   
c
t r
c
r
c
t r
c
t r X w , , , ln ε β + = , (7) 
where t and c index time period and country, respectively,  { } , rh s =  denotes the highest attained 
level of schooling (higher education with university degree or completed secondary school), w is 
monthly contractual wages after taxes at the primary job, X is a set of observable characteristics 
of individuals and firms, a stochastic error term ε  absorbs unobservable characteristics of 
individuals.  The coefficients  c
r β  can be interpreted as prices for various observable 
characteristics of workers.  In Table 5, we present the estimates of Eq.7 for university and 
secondary school graduates by country in 2002.  
For each level of schooling, we construct four counterfactual wage distributions: 
1.  Russian observables, Ukrainian prices, and Ukrainian unobservables:  
 
( ) ( ) 1
,, ln
UKR UKR RUS RUS UKR
rt rt r r wX βε =+   
2.  Ukrainian observables, Russian prices, and Ukrainian unobservables: 
   
( ) 2
,, ln
UKR UKR RUS UKR
rt rt r r wX β ε =+  
3.  Ukrainian observables, Ukrainian prices, and Russian unobservables:  
 
( ) ( ) 3
,, ln
UKR RUS UKR UKR UKR
rt rt r r wX βε =+  
4.  Ukrainian observables, Russian prices, and Russian unobservables: 
 
( ) ( ) 4
,, ln
UKR RUS UKR UKR RUS
rt rt r r wX βε =+  
The counterfactual unobservables are computed nonparametrically using the JMP 
method.  Specifically,   ( ) ( )
() 1
,, , , , |
RUS UKR UKR UKR
rt R U Sr U K Rr rt rt FF X εε
− = , where 
) (
,
UKR RUS
t r ε  is Russian 
counterfactual residuals corresponding to an Ukrainian individual with the level of schooling r at 
period t conditional on characteristics X,  UKR
t r, ε  is actual Ukrainian residual,  
1
RUS F
−  denotes the 
inverse cumulative distribution of Russian residuals, and UKR F  denotes cumulative distribution of 
Ukrainian residuals.  The formula for Ukrainian counterfactual residuals is reverse:    15
() ()
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UKR RUS RUS RUS
rt U K Rr R U Sr rt rt FF X εε
− = . 
The difference between counterfactual wage distribution for the individuals with a 
university degree and counterfactual wage distribution for individuals with completed secondary 
education is the counterfactual university wage premium.  We present actual and counterfactual 
distributions of university wage premium for 2002 in Figure 5.      
The area between the actual university wage premium in Russia and its counterfactual 
premium in Ukraine (or the distance between the two distributions) can be used in assessing the 
relative contribution of each factor into observed differences in returns to university education.  
The factors that are more important should bring Ukrainian counterfactual distributions closer to 
the Russian actual distribution.  To quantify the relative importance of each of the factors, we 
employ the following measure of the distance between the actual and counterfactual (m) 
distributions in period t (dtm): 
∑
=
∆ − ∆ =
100
1
) ( ln ln
100
1
k
m UKR
t k
RUS
t k tm w w d . (8) 
If distributions of wage premium coincide, then dtm=0.  The larger is the value of dtm, the larger is 
the difference between the distributions, and therefore, the smaller is the contribution of the 
corresponding factor.  We report the distance measure as well as the key percentiles and means 
of actual and counterfactual university premium for 2002 in Table 6.
21 
In the earlier discussion of the descriptive statistics, we noted that Russia and Ukraine 
have very similar observable characteristics.  Not surprisingly, then we find that the differences 
in observable characteristics contribute very little to explaining the differences in the skill wage 
premium in all years.  When Russian observable characteristics are rewarded according to 
Ukrainian pricing schedules (counterfactual 1), the mean skill premium and the distance measure 
barely change relative to the actual skill premium in Ukraine.  
In contrast, when the Russian slopes are used to price the Ukrainian observable 
characteristics (counterfactual 2), the mean skill premium sharply increases from 27.1% to 42% 
in 2002 and the distance between the two distributions considerably shrinks.  Note that the 
changes in prices do not uniformly increase the university premium.  The highest increase in the 
                                                 
21 Results for earlier years are very similar to those for 2002 and therefore not reported and available upon request.   16
premium is at top percentiles (18 percentage points at the 90
th percentile) and the gain in 
premium is generally increasing with percentiles.   
Because the mean of counterfactual residuals is close to zero, the counterfactual 3 does 
not significantly change the mean skill premium.  However, unobservables tend to decrease the 
premium in the right tail of the distribution and increase it in the left tail thus making its shape 
closer to the actual university premium in the Russian data.  This reduces the distance between 
the two distributions but not significantly (see Figure 5 and Table 6).  Combining Ukrainian 
labor force composition with Russian prices for both observable and unobservable characteristics 
brings the counterfactual wage distributions (counterfactual 4) even closer to the actual 
distribution of Russian returns.  Overall, it is clear that the differences in pricing schedules for 
observed characteristics play a major role in explaining skill premium differences between 
Ukraine and Russia. 
5.  Conclusion 
In the present paper, we estimate and compare returns to schooling in Russia and Ukraine 
– two countries that belonged to the former Soviet Union and inherited similar institutions and 
starting conditions.  We take advantage of the institutional comparability between the two 
countries and the definitional comparability between the two household surveys in order to 
examine the cross-country differences in returns to schooling during the 1985-2002 period.  The 
key finding is that after the breakup of the Soviet Union returns to schooling significantly 
diverged between Russia and Ukraine.  In 2002, the estimated returns to schooling were two 
times less in Ukraine (4.5%) than in Russia (9.2%).  We show that this fact is remarkably robust 
to modifications in econometric specifications, definitions of variables, and weighting schemes.  
Furthermore, we show that the divergence is present not only in the average returns to schooling 
but also in the distributions of returns to schooling. 
To understand what determines the disparity in returns to schooling, we apply 
semiparametric methods in constructing counterfactual wage distributions for university- and 
secondary school-educated workers and assess the changes in skill wage premium in response to 
changes in observable characteristics, prices, and residuals.  We observe that both countries 
exhibit very similar skill composition and other characteristics of the labor force during the pre-
reform and reform periods.  We find that the difference in observable characteristics contributes   17
very little to observed differences in the skill premium across countries.  Our estimates thus 
indicate that the differences in returns to schooling are unlikely to be supply driven. 
We also conclude that the cross-country differences in unobservable characteristics do 
not significantly contribute to understanding the differences in returns to schooling.  When the 
Russian unobservable characteristics are combined with Ukrainian observable characteristics and 
Ukrainian prices, the shape of the distribution of the skill premium in Ukraine becomes closer to 
the one in Russia but the distance between the two distributions remains significant (although 
somewhat smaller).  Perhaps common history, active migration of families between Russia and 
Ukraine, similar human capital and abilities, same preferences for higher education, and shared 
institutional and organizational practices are the factors that contribute to more or less similar 
unobservable characteristics in the two countries. 
In contrast, the differences in prices of observable characteristics play a critical role.  Had 
Ukrainian workers been rewarded according to Russian pricing schedules, the skill premium 
would be comparable to that in Russia.  Why are prices (slopes) so much different between the 
two countries?  The answer to this question awaits a separate study.  The lower demand for 
educated labor, more limited labor mobility, higher separation costs, and the larger extent of 
trade unions in Ukraine are most likely determinants with a potential power to explain the 
differences in returns to schooling.     18
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Russia 
  1985 1990 1996 1998 2000 2002 
    Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Log(wages)  -1.697 0.533  -1.367 0.628 6.173 0.951 6.462 0.845 7.115 0.908 7.856 0.839 
Schooling (adjusted years)  10.742  3.070  11.212  2.748  11.774  2.423 11.879  2.342 11.911  2.236 12.417 2.329 
Schooling  (actual  years)  …  …  …  …  12.317  2.770 12.499  2.694 12.522  2.574 12.658 2.716 
Female  0.482 0.500 0.475 0.499 0.505 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.491 0.500 0.503 0.500 
Tenure  (years)  …  …  …  …  7.933 8.691 7.680 8.517 7.185 8.207 7.627 9.068 
Experience  (years)  21.390 11.984 20.901 11.625 20.407 10.856 20.431 10.703 20.562 10.500 20.997 11.654 
Log(hours)  … … … …  3.680 0.405 3.702 0.327 3.750 0.313 3.749 0.311 
Hours missing  … … … …  0.125 0.331 0.016 0.125 0.026 0.158 0.013 0.115 
Capital  city  0.033 0.180 0.031 0.174 0.068 0.252 0.051 0.220 0.033 0.180 0.066 0.249 
O w n e r s h i p                  
Private  …  …  …  …  0.278 0.448 0.295 0.456 0.337 0.473 0.410 0.492 
Foreign   … … … …  0.032 0.175 0.033 0.179 0.039 0.194 0.043 0.202 
State   … … … …  0.541 0.498 0.517 0.500 0.486 0.500 0.467 0.499 
No information  … … … …  0.149 0.356 0.155 0.361 0.138 0.345 0.080 0.272 
Employer size (no. of persons)                
1-10  … … … …  0.108 0.310 0.112 0.316 0.141 0.348 0.163 0.369 
10-50  … … … …  0.199 0.399 0.194 0.396 0.183 0.387 0.208 0.406 
50-100  … … … …  0.099 0.299 0.107 0.309 0.097 0.296 0.093 0.290 
100-500  … … … …  0.166 0.373 0.174 0.379 0.170 0.376 0.174 0.379 
500-1000  … … … …  0.043 0.202 0.057 0.232 0.061 0.239 0.063 0.244 
>1000  … … … …  0.083 0.275 0.078 0.268 0.091 0.288 0.089 0.285 
Size is missing  … … … …  0.302 0.459 0.278 0.448 0.257 0.437 0.209 0.407 
Sample size, N  4111 3776 3497 3332 3169 3341 
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Table 1: continued 
Panel B: Ukraine 
  1986 1991 1997 1998 2000 2002 
    Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. Mean St.Dev. 
Log(wages)  -8.791 0.528  -8.666 0.626 5.010 0.634 5.106 0.623 5.312 0.607 5.481 0.640 
Schooling (adjusted years)  10.750  2.892  11.157  2.559  11.612  2.361 11.688  2.275 11.822  2.239 11.849  2.217 
Schooling (actual years)  … … … …  10.915  2.077 10.977  2.011 11.074  2.012 11.118  2.028 
Female  0.496 0.500 0.483 0.500 0.537 0.499 0.539 0.499 0.538 0.499 0.530 0.499 
Tenure  (years)  10.406 9.931  10.306 9.984 9.248 9.617 9.379 9.730 8.770 9.466 8.464 9.326 
Experience  (years)  21.241 11.860 21.331 11.797 21.088 11.104 21.183 10.793 20.884 10.607 21.198 10.706 
Log(hours)  … … … … … … …    … … …  3.659 0.324 
Hours missing  … … … … … … … … … …  0.097 0.296 
Capital  city  0.037 0.190 0.036 0.187 0.058 0.235 0.058 0.233 0.065 0.246 0.063 0.243 
O w n e r s h i p               
Private  0.104 0.305 0.154 0.361 0.224 0.417 0.242 0.428 0.276 0.447 0.298 0.457 
Foreign    0.005 0.071 0.009 0.095 0.015 0.120 0.013 0.112 0.015 0.120 0.016 0.127 
State    0.885 0.320 0.828 0.377 0.744 0.436 0.723 0.448 0.683 0.465 0.652 0.476 
No  information  0.007 0.082 0.009 0.093 0.018 0.132 0.022 0.147 0.026 0.159 0.033 0.180 
Employer  size  (no.  of  persons)             
1-10  0.074 0.261 0.089 0.285 0.106 0.308 0.104 0.305 0.122 0.327 0.148 0.355 
10-50  0.092 0.290 0.103 0.304 0.143 0.350 0.159 0.366 0.176 0.381 0.208 0.406 
50-100  0.055 0.229 0.060 0.237 0.085 0.279 0.094 0.292 0.103 0.303 0.113 0.317 
100-500  0.090 0.287 0.112 0.315 0.143 0.350 0.152 0.359 0.168 0.374 0.187 0.390 
500-1000  0.031 0.174 0.031 0.172 0.042 0.201 0.044 0.205 0.051 0.220 0.062 0.241 
>1000  0.073 0.260 0.089 0.284 0.117 0.321 0.126 0.332 0.136 0.343 0.150 0.357 
Size  is  missing  0.584 0.493 0.517 0.500 0.365 0.481 0.321 0.467 0.245 0.430 0.133 0.339 
Sample size, N  4191 3528 2946 2812 2925 3289 
Note.  The sample for each country and year consists of observations with non-missing values for the variables used in the basic Mincerian wage function.  
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Table 2:  Basic Mincerian Earnings Functions, OLS 
Panel A: Russia 
  1985 1990 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Schooling (adjusted years)  0.028*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.091***  0.093*** 0.092***
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Experience (years)  0.019*** 0.027*** 0.014*** 0.029***  0.045*** 0.030***
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Experience
2 /1000  -0.378*** -0.554*** -0.335*** -0.629*** -0.991*** -0.724*** 
  (0.055) (0.072) (0.119) (0.108) (0.129) (0.119) 
Female -0.424*** -0.401*** -0.473*** -0.530***  -0.520*** -0.473***
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.030) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) 
Capital  0.011 0.095 0.614*** 0.537***  0.634*** 0.630***
  (0.044) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061) (0.082) (0.053) 
N  4111 3776 3497 3332 3169 3341 
R
2  0.19 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.15 0.18 
        
Panel B: Ukraine 
  1986 1991 1997 1998 2000 2002 
Schooling (adjusted years)  0.034*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.039***  0.038*** 0.045***
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Experience (years)  0.012*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.016***  0.016*** 0.019***
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Experience
2 /1000 -0.230*** -0.320*** -0.436*** -0.395***  -0.415*** -0.502***
  (0.063) (0.078) (0.084) (0.088) (0.090)  (0.092) 
Female -0.418*** -0.434*** -0.423*** -0.423***  -0.413*** -0.398***
  (0.016) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Capital 0.159*** 0.167*** 0.267*** 0.274***  0.301*** 0.285***
  (0.044) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) (0.042) (0.043) 
N  4191 3528 2946 2812 2925 3289 
R
2  0.20 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Note.  Dependent variable is log of monthly contractual wages after taxes at the primary job.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table 
A2.  The sample weights are applied in Russia for all years and in Ukraine for 1986 and 1991.  The sample is restricted to age 15-
59.  The constant term is estimated but not shown here.  
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Table 3:  Augmented Mincerian Earnings Functions, OLS 
  Russia   Ukraine 
  1996 1998 2000 2002    1997 1998 2000 2002 
Schooling  (adjusted  years)  0.079*** 0.091*** 0.094*** 0.097***   0.036*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.048*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)    (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Experience  (years)  0.013**  0.025*** 0.042*** 0.027***    0.021*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.004) 
Experience
2 /1000  -0.290**  -0.553*** -0.881*** -0.639***    -0.438*** -0.362*** -0.365*** -0.456*** 
  (0.126) (0.111) (0.131) (0.123)    (0.089) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) 
Female  -0.448*** -0.486*** -0.448*** -0.426***    -0.386*** -0.383*** -0.378*** -0.347*** 
  (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026)    (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) 
Capital  0.552*** 0.490*** 0.602*** 0.573***    0.226*** 0.240*** 0.271*** 0.231*** 
  (0.059) (0.059) (0.080) (0.052)    (0.045) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) 
Tenure  (years)  0.003 0.007 0.001 0.005    -0.005  -0.001 0.005 0.008** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)    (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tenure
2 /1000  -0.068 -0.206 -0.111 -0.160    0.127  0.086 -0.097 -0.153 
  (0.191) (0.169) (0.194) (0.166)    (0.112) (0.112) (0.116) (0.119) 
Ownership             
Private    0.299*** 0.364*** 0.401*** 0.325***    0.161*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.262*** 
  (0.036) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029)    (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) 
Foreign    0.486*** 0.461*** 0.423*** 0.541***    0.389*** 0.408***  0.425***  0.446*** 
  (0.086) (0.076) (0.077) (0.065)    (0.093) (0.096) (0.086) (0.081) 
Employer size (no. of persons)                 
10-50  -0.048 -0.046 -0.100*  -0.067    -0.009 -0.028 -0.032  0.046 
  (0.058) (0.049) (0.053) (0.043)    (0.043) (0.043) (0.038) (0.035) 
50-100  -0.046 0.060 0.031 0.095*    -0.013 0.014 0.032 0.114*** 
  (0.067) (0.057) (0.062) (0.054)    (0.049) (0.049) (0.044) (0.041) 
100-500  0.036 0.074 0.091*  0.090**    0.098**  0.108**  0.116***  0.220*** 
  (0.060) (0.051)  (0.055) (0.046)   (0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.037) 
500-1000  0.229*** 0.290*** 0.155**  0.211***    0.149**  0.153**  0.187*** 0.283*** 
  (0.086) (0.068) (0.072) (0.061)    (0.062) (0.061) (0.054) (0.050) 
>1000  0.054  0.216*** 0.286*** 0.236***    0.245*** 0.291*** 0.313*** 0.450*** 
  (0.071) (0.062) (0.064) (0.055)    (0.046) (0.046) (0.042) (0.039) 
N  3413 3275 3139 3284    2932 2802 2916 3278 
R
2  0.15 0.22 0.21 0.23    0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 
Note.  Dependent variable is log of monthly contractual wages after taxes at the primary job.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Definitions of the variables are in Appendix Table A2.  Sample weights are applied in Russia.  The sample is 
restricted to age 15-59.  Omitted categories are 1-10 (employer size) and state (ownership).  Intercept and two dummy variables for missing employer size and 
missing ownership are included but not shown here.   25
Table 4:  Sensitivity Analysis of the Estimated Returns to Schooling 
Panel A: Russia 
  1985 1990 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Without survey weights  0.027     0.039     0.081     0.094     0.097     0.096    
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Without restrictions on age  0.027     0.037     0.077     0.083     0.086     0.089    
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
  [4220] [3964] [3676] [3537] [3374] [3531] 
Schooling (actual years)  …  …  0.068     0.078     0.080     0.080    
      (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
      [3469] [3298] [3159] [3310] 
With wages actually   …  …  0.065  0.090  0.092  0.086 
received  last  month      (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) 
      [2445] [2326] [2649] [2906] 
With log of hourly wage   …  …  0.085  0.097  0.102  0.101 
rate      (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
      [3061] [3281] [3090] [3297] 
With industry dummies  0.032     0.042     0.079     0.091     0.093     … 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)   
  [3982] [3679] [3477] [3316] [3132]   
With  district fixed effects  0.023     0.030     0.063     0.069     0.073     0.074    
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
        
Panel B: Ukraine 
  1986 1991 1997 1998 2000 2002 
Without survey weights  0.031     0.039     0.037     0.039     0.038     0.045    
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Without restrictions on   0.034     0.039     0.040     0.040     0.035     0.046    
age  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
  [4192] [3564] [3073] [2945] [3099] [3494] 
Schooling  (actual  years)  …  …  0.041 0.046 0.048 0.054 
      (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
      [2914] [2779] [2892] [3251] 
With wages actually   …  …  …  …  …  0.050    
received  last  month        (0.005) 
        [3066] 
With log of hourly wage   …  …  …  …  …  0.051 
rate        (0.005) 
        [2971] 
With wages actually             0.048 
received over the last six            (0.005) 
months        [2570] 
Based on IV estimation  0.073     0.092     0.088     0.103     0.111     0.120 
  (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
  [3764] [3193] [2722] [2604] [2731] [3058] 
With parents’ background  0.031     0.034     0.032     0.030     0.029     0.038    
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  [3766] [3196] [2742] [2619] [2748] [3061] 
Note.  The table shows the estimated returns to schooling based on the alternative specifications of the basic Mincerian 
equation (shown in Table 2).  Robust standard errors are in parentheses; all coefficients are significant at 1%.  The number of 
observations is in brackets if it is different from Table 2.     26
Table 5:  Earnings Functions for University and Secondary School Graduates, OLS, 2002 
 Ukraine    Russia   
   University  Secondary 
school 
   University  Secondary 
school 
   (1)  (2)      (3)  (4) 
Female   0.244*** 0.350***    0.391*** 0.446*** 
    (0.045) (0.033)      (0.051) (0.042) 
Experience (years)    0.018*  0.014**      0.041***  0.024*** 
    (0.009) (0.006)      (0.010) (0.009) 
Experience
2 /1000    -0.424*  -0.357**      -0.979***  -0.612*** 
    (0.239) (0.146)      (0.268) (0.203) 
Capital   -0.037  0.355***     0.482***  0.655*** 
    (0.074) (0.065)      (0.084) (0.090) 
Tenure (years)    0.005  0.008      0.019*  -0.004 
    (0.008) (0.007)      (0.010) (0.008) 
Tenure
2 /1000    -0.104  -0.222      -0.538  0.162 
    (0.258) (0.219)      (0.352) (0.283) 
Ownership             
Private     0.292*** 0.253***    0.417*** 0.334*** 
    (0.062) (0.042)      (0.057) (0.047) 
Foreign     0.076  0.523***     0.745***  0.677*** 
    (0.157) (0.115)      (0.127) (0.107) 
Employer size (no. of persons)               
10-50   -0.049  0.024      -0.067  -0.024 
    (0.091) (0.061)      (0.090) (0.068) 
50-100   0.125  0.012      -0.024  0.205** 
    (0.094) (0.076)      (0.103) (0.090) 
100-500    0.143 0.217***     0.130 0.091 
   (0.099)  (0.061)      (0.094)  (0.072) 
500-1000   0.215*  0.308***     0.064  0.300*** 
    (0.124) (0.072)      (0.118) (0.094) 
>1000   0.370***  0.475***     0.005  0.413*** 
    (0.099) (0.064)      (0.109) (0.087) 
Constant   5.224*** 4.852***    7.373*** 7.017*** 
    (0.120) (0.087)      (0.120) (0.095) 
N   663  1375      753  1345 
R
2   0.16  0.19      0.25  0.20 
Note.  Dependent variable is log of monthly contractual wages after taxes at the primary job.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Definitions 
of the variables are in Appendix Table A2.  Sample weights are applied in Russia.  The sample is restricted to 
age 15-59.  Omitted categories are 1-10 (employer size) and state (ownership).  Two dummy variables for 
missing employer size and missing ownership are included but not shown here. 
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Table 6:  Actual and Counterfactual Distributions of University Wage Premium, 2002 
 Selected  Percentiles 
  
Mean  dtm 
10  25  50 75 90 
Actual university wage premium 
Russia  0.439  -  0.628  0.382  0.337 0.319 0.379 
Ukraine  0.271 0.154 0.470  0.287  0.333 0.182 0.182 
           
Counterfactual university wage premium for Ukraine 
Counterfactual  1  0.277 0.158 0.458  0.290  0.235 0.186 0.180 
Counterfactual  2  0.420 0.073 0.476  0.444  0.399 0.356 0.360 
Counterfactual  3  0.277 0.138 0.499  0.303  0.303 0.136 0.117 
Counterfactual  4  0.427 0.069 0.554  0.485  0.417 0.311 0.311 
Note.  The university premium is defined as the difference between wages of individuals with a university degree and 
wages of individuals with completed secondary school.  Counterfactual 1 corresponds to Russian characteristics and 
Ukrainian prices for observable and unobservable characteristics.  Counterfactual 2 corresponds to Ukrainian 
characteristics, Russian coefficients (prices) and Ukrainian unobservable characteristics.  Counterfactual 3 corresponds to 
Ukrainian characteristics, Ukrainian coefficients (prices) and Russian unobservable characteristics.  Counterfactual 4 
corresponds to Ukrainian characteristics, Russian coefficients (prices) and Russian unobservable characteristics (residuals).  
Econometric specification is as in Table 5.  dtm is the distance between the actual Russian distribution and counterfactual 
Ukrainian distributions (computed as in Eq.8).    28
Figure 1:  Wage Distributions, Russia and Ukraine 
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Note.  In all graphs, broken and solid lines correspond to Ukraine and Russia, respectively.  Wages are rescaled so that the mean log 
wages in Russia is equal to the mean log wage in Ukraine for each year.  The plotted densities use Parzen kernel with bandwidth of 0.45.    29
Figure 2:  Distribution of the Returns to Schooling, Russia and Ukraine, Quantile Estimates 
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Note.  In all graphs, broken and solid lines correspond to Ukraine and Russia, respectively.  The estimated equation is the basic 
Mincerian specification shown in Table 2.  A locally weighted regression (lowess) with bandwidth 0.5 is used to smooth percentile estimates 
in the figure. 
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Figure 3:  Kernel Density Estimates of Log Wages, Russia and Ukraine 
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Note.  In all graphs, broken and solid lines correspond to university and secondary school-educated workers, respectively.  Wages are 
rescaled so that the mean log wages in Russia is equal to the mean log wage in Ukraine for each year.  The plotted densities use Parzen 
kernel with bandwidth of 0.45.    
   31
Figure 4:  Distribution of University Wage Premium, Russia and Ukraine 
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Note.  In all graphs, broken and solid lines correspond to Ukraine and Russia, respectively.  The university wage premium at a given 
percentile is defined as the differences in mean wages between university and secondary school-educated workers at a given percentile.  A 
locally weighted regression (lowess) with bandwidth 0.5 is used to smooth percentile estimates in the figure. 
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Figure 5: Actual and Counterfactual Distributions of University Wage Premium, 2002 
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Note.  The thick solid line is actual Russian distribution of university wage premium, the thick long dash line is actual 
Ukrainian distribution, the bottom dotted line is counterfactual 1 (Russian observables), the dash/dot line is counterfactual 2 
(Russian prices), the dash line is counterfactual 3 (Russian unobservables), and the top long dash line is counterfactual 4 
(Russian prices and unobservables).  The university wage premium at a given percentile is defined as the differences in mean 
wages between university and secondary school-educated workers at a given percentile.  A locally weighted regression 
(“lowess”) with bandwidth 0.5 is used to smooth percentile estimates in the figure. 
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Appendix Table A1:  Construction of the Sample 
Panel A. Russia 
  1985 1990 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Number of adult questionnaires  …  …  8342  8701  9074  10497 
Representative  cross-sections  7074 7076 8122 7894 7568 7875 
Non-missing  wages  and  schooling  4230 3976 3684 3544 3384 3541 
Age  15-59  4121 3783 3501 3338 3176 3351 
Final  sample  4111 3776 3497 3332 3169 3341 
 
Panel B. Ukraine 
  1986 1991 1997 1998 2000 2002 
Non-missing  wages  and  schooling  4197 3577 3085 2958 3109 3504 
Age  15-59  4196 3541 2950 2819 2930 3291 
Final  sample  4191 3528 2946 2812 2925 3289 
Note.  For 1996-2002, representative cross-sections in RLMS exclude respondents that moved from the original 
sample of dwellings to the new address.  For 1985 and 1990, representative cross-sections show the number of 
respondents answered to the retrospective questions in 2000. The initial number of questionnaires in Ukraine was 
8641.  The final sample excludes a few outliers in log of wages.   
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Appendix Table A2:  Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable Russia  Ukraine 
Wage  • 1998-2002:  Average monthly wage after 
taxes at the primary job (regardless of 
whether it was paid on time or not) for 
employees; monetary and in-kind 
payments actually received after taxes at 
the primary job in the last 30 days for 
self-employed; 
• 1994-1996:  We followed the method of 
Earle and Sabirianova (2002), imputing 
the contractual wage as the ratio of the 
total wage debt to the number of monthly 
wages owed; monetary and in-kind 
payments actually received after taxes at 
the primary job in the last 30 days for 
employees without wage arrears and self-
employed 
• 1985-1990:  Average monthly wage 
 
Monthly contractual wage after taxes at the 
primary job in December of the 
corresponding year. All wages are 
converted into hryvnyas.   
 
 
Adjusted Years of 
Schooling 
Education status from the survey has been 
converted into a continuous variable 
representing adjusted years of schooling.  
To make them consistent with ULMS, 
adjusted years of schooling were taken as 4 
for 1-6 grades, 8 for 7-9 grades, 10 for 10-
12 secondary school grades, 9 for a 
vocational non-secondary school diploma, 
11.5 for a vocational secondary school 
diploma, 13 for a technical school diploma 
and incomplete higher education, 15 for a 
diploma of specialist, and 18 for a Ph.D. 
degree. 
 
Education status from the survey has been 
converted into a continuous variable 
representing adjusted years of schooling.  
Adjusted years of schooling were taken as 
4 for 1-6 grades, 8 for 7-9 grades, 10 for 
10-12 secondary school grades, 9 for a 
vocational non-secondary school diploma, 
11.5 for a vocational secondary school 
diploma, 13 for a technical school diploma 
and incomplete higher education, 14 for a 
bachelor degree, 15 for a diploma of 
specialist, 16 for a master degree, and 18 
for a Ph.D. degree.  Educational histories 
are used to compute adjusted years of 
schooling for previous years.  Same 
definitions are used to compute adjusted 
years of schooling of parents.   
 
Actual Years of 
Schooling 
Total number of years in a school including 
part-time schools, evening schools, and 
courses by correspondence;  available for 
1995-2002 
 
Total number of years in a school including 
part-time schools, evening schools, and 
courses by correspondence;  available for 
2002 
Female  =1 if female 
 
=1 if female 
Potential Labor 
Market Experience 
 
 
Age minus years of schooling minus 6  Age minus years of schooling minus 6   35
Tenure  Number of years since an individual started 
the primary job 
 
Number of years since an individual started 
the primary job 
Weekly Hours of 
Work 
2002: average hours in the usual work 
week at the primary job 
 
2002:  hours per week an individual usually 
works at the primary job; not available for 
other years 
 
Hours of Work 
Missing 
 
=1 if hours of work missing  =1 if hours of work missing 
University Degree  =1 if has completed higher education  
 
=1 if has completed higher education  
 
Secondary School  =1 if has completed secondary education 
without secondary specialized or higher 
education 
 
=1 if has completed secondary education 
without secondary specialized or higher 
education 
 
Parents’ 
occupations 
N/A  Dummy variables for a manual non-
agricultural worker, a collective 
farmer/agricultural worker, a non-manual 
worker 
 
Capital 
 
=1 if resides in Moscow  =1 if resides in Kyiv 
Foreign  =1 if primary employer is owned or co-
owned by foreign firms or foreign 
individuals 
=1 if primary employer is domestically 
owned with some foreign capital or 
foreign-owned (including international 
organizations) 
 
Private   =1 if primary employer is owned or co-
owned by Russian private firms or Russian 
individuals (with no foreign participation); 
or if an individual is self-employed 
=1 if primary employer is a privatized 
enterprise, a newly established private 
enterprise, or a cooperative (with no 
foreign participation); or if an individual is 
self-employed 
 
State  =1 if primary employer is owned by state  =1 if primary employer is a budgetary 
organization, a state enterprise, a local 
municipal enterprise, a state farm, or a 
collective farm 
 
Ownership Missing   =1 if ownership missing  =1 if ownership missing 
 
Firm Size  Number of persons working at enterprise of 
primary job:  1-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-500, 
501-1000, 1001+, and no information; =1-
10 for self-employed.  
Number of persons working at enterprise 
(workplace for self-employed) of primary 
job:  1-10, 11-50, 51-100, 101-500, 501-
1000, 1001+, and no information.  
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Appendix Table A3:  Employment Distribution by the Level of Schooling 
 
Panel A: Russia 
Schooling Level  1985 1990 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Secondary  school  (0-6  grades)  8.04 4.24 0.94 0.57 0.31 0.21 
Secondary school (7-9 grades)  15.51  12.45  8.97  7.76  6.96  6.98 
Vocational school with no high school diploma  5.66  5.35  4.06  4.31  3.94  3.43 
Secondary  school  (10-12  grades)  23.32 24.19 24.51 23.67 23.68 23.31 
Vocational school with high school diploma  10.68  13.67  15.08  16.48  18.23  17.52 
Technical  school  20.88 22.87 24.79 25.58 25.98 25.69 
University  15.33 16.58 20.79 20.67 20.18 22.02 
Graduate  school  0.58 0.64 0.86 0.96 0.72 0.84 
N  4111 3776 3497 3332 3169 3341 
        
Panel B: Ukraine 
Schooling Level  1986 1991 1997 1998 2000 2002 
Secondary  school  (0-6  grades)  6.56 2.95 1.02 0.67 0.61 0.46 
Secondary  school  (7-9  grades)  12.77  10.39 6.75 5.89 4.20 4.16 
Vocational school with no high school diploma  7.19  7.64  7.69  7.66  7.71  7.63 
Secondary  school  (10-12  grades)  27.03 27.28 25.46 25.26 23.99 24.40 
Vocational school with high school diploma  11.62  14.56  15.12  16.03  17.41  17.44 
Technical  school  21.56 22.54 26.17 26.36 26.76 25.71 
University  12.83 14.23 17.69 18.02 19.11 20.02 
Graduate  school  0.46 0.40 0.10 0.11 0.20 0.18 
N  4191 3528 2946 2812 2925 3289 
Note.  The sample is restricted to the respondents aged 15-59 with non-missing values for the variables used in 
the basic Mincerian wage function.  The sample weights are applied for 1985/1986 and 1990/1991 in both countries.  
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